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Government Role and the Efficiency of Policy Instruments by Vito Tanzi Reviews

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Abstract

Comparisons about the part of the government in an economy are usually made by reference to the share of tax acquirement or of public expenditure in gross domestic product. However, governments often utilise other tools for pursuing their objectives. The newspaper discusses these other tools, shows the extent to which they tin can supplant the traditional financial instruments, and assesses their quantitative importance. Various highly speculative hypotheses are advanced virtually the role of these other tools in countries at different levels of development.

I. Current Fence on the Function of Government

For the past several years, a raging debate has been going on about the role that the public sector should play in the contemporary world. The collapse of the centrally planned economies and the existent, or declared, failures of the welfare state in mixed economies accept brought virtually an in-depth reevaluation of that part in an surroundings that is much more promarket than was the case in contempo decades. As this and other recent economic conferences ostend, perhaps, at no other fourth dimension has so much attention been paid, by economists, political scientists, and policymakers, to what the government should do.

In this largely normative debate, some economists contend in favor of a minimalist state, in which the government should accept very limited functions essentially justified by the narrow application of economical arguments related to market failure such as the existence of externalities, public goods, monopolies, and informational deficiencies. These economists reveal much faith in the market and little faith in the deportment of the authorities. Others argue that the retreat of the state from many activities, and a more timid role for information technology, would lead to many issues such as the growing incidence of criminal offense (and peculiarly of organized offense), the growth of poverty, a progressively less fifty-fifty income distribution, and so forth. They justify a larger authorities office by recourse to the Musgravian functions, such equally allocation of resources, when the market fails to exercise so optimally; the redistribution of income, when the market generates a distribution that is not considered fair by lodge; and the stabilization of economical activities, when the automatic working of the market leads to economic instability accompanied by unemployment, inflation, and residue of payments disequilibrium.

In mod and complex societies the objectives pursued by the government have get broader and more difficult to define. For example, it is now better recognized that the individual sector may neglect to allocate resources optimally not simply at a moment in fourth dimension, but inter-temporally thus justifying public sector intervention vis-à-vis many new areas that involve dissimilar periods such as the surroundings, enquiry, and pensions. The distribution of income has too acquired more facets as governmental intervention has been justified not merely past the uneven size distribution of income but, with Increasing frequency, by income differences which may arise because of gender, age, and ethnic, regional and physical characteristics of individuals. Fifty-fifty the stabilization function has become more than multidimensional and, now, it may relate to output, employment, toll level, balance of payment, public debt, level of public spending, and level of taxation.

A quantitative impression of what a minimalist state might imply in terms of the level of public spending is provided by the historical statistics, for the 1870-1913 catamenia, shown in Table 1. It will be seen that regime expenditure, every bit a share of Gdp, was much lower a century ago than in later years. These low shares of public spending into GDP, were non exhibited past archaic societies only by societies that were quite advanced and sophisticated. However, in that flow the state did not engage in activities such equally higher education, provision of health services, social security and public welfare on a mass scale, unemployment compensation, and many others that are now common.

Table 1.

The Growth of Regime Expenditure, 1870-1990

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: European Committee, Tables on General Authorities Data, 1995; OECD Economic Outlook, 1994 and 1995; Vito Tanzi and Domenico Fanizza, "Financial Deficit and Public Debt in Industrial Countries, 1970-94," WP/95/49, May 1995; B. R. Mitchell, "International Historical Statistics," (various issues); Acha Hernandez, "Datos Basicos para la Historia de Financiera de España," 1976; Bureau of Census, "Historical Statistics of the U.Due south.A.," 1975; IMF, Government Finance Statistics; International monetary fund, World Economic Outlook. Tabular array reproduced from Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht, "The Growth of Government and the Reform of the State," (IMF Working Newspaper, forthcoming).

Or nearest available year afterwards 1870, before 1913, afterward 1920, and before 1937.

Average computed without Germany, Nippon, and Spain (all undergoing war or state of war preparations at this fourth dimension).

GFS data, data available for 1960 is 1970.

An impression of the level of expenditure needed by an extended office of the public sector is provided by statistics for recent years specially for the so-called welfare states among the industrial countries. Table 1 provides these statistics. It will be seen that, for some countries, total public spending has exceeded l percent of Gdp and has even approached or exceeded 60 percent of Gdp. For the group of countries reported in Table one, public spending, as a share of Gdp, grew from an average of around 10 percentage at the beginning of the century to 45 percent in recent years. 1/ These data refer to market-oriented industrial countries. In the centrally planned economies that characterized Eastern Europe, the role of the state was even more extended.

Ii. The "Efficiency" of Policy Instruments

The economical discussion on the function of the state has been conducted in terms of market failure, emphasized by those who wished to justify a larger office; or, in terms of regime failure, emphasized by those who wished to limit that role (come across Stiglitz, 1995). Among the latter, a particularly influential group has been that associated with the public choice school. The components of this grouping have shown how hire-seeking by special interests and other bureaucratic behavior lead to the growth of regime expenditure and to the failure of public policy in achieving its stated objectives. 2/ (Encounter Mueller 1989.) In the public sector, principal-agent problems are mutual and the difficulty of writing precise but not excessively constraining contracts or Instructions for the behavior of agents acting on behalf of the public sector leads to results that are often at odd with the objectives of the policymakers. In many countries, corruption on the part of some public officials adds to the problem. (See Tanzi, forthcoming.)

In this paper, I wish to focus on a dissimilar aspect of the office of authorities, an aspect that is neither related to traditional market failure nor to regime failure in the public choice sense. This aspect has been largely ignored in the literature and especially in the public finance literature. It relates to the gap that ofttimes exists between government goals and the availability of fiscal instruments necessary to pursue those goals and how governments react to that gap. Because the policy instruments are the vehicles that must implement, or are supposed to implement, the intentions of the policymakers, when these instruments are not available or are not efficient, difficulties may arise. 1/ When this gap exists, there are two possibilities: either the policymakers give up in pursuing some of their objectives, or, at least, they modify their objectives to make them consistent with the available instruments; or they keep to pursue the same objectives but they do so through reliance on less efficient instruments.

Unfortunately, the second possibility seems to be common thus resulting in poor economic policy and in a more dislocated function of the state. The final results from governmental activeness are, thus, often unlike from the intended results. In this context, the "efficiency" of a policy Musical instrument is divers à la Tinbergen: an instrument is efficient when a modest alter in it brings about a pregnant change in the policy objective pursued through the use of that musical instrument. (Encounter Johansen, 1965, pp. 12-xiv.) Information technology is thus non the usual allocative definition of efficiency.

Economists and political scientists generally associate the telescopic and the importance of the public sector (or, putting it differently, the office of the government) with the share of public spending or tax revenue in national income. Public finance courses deal with taxing and spending and ignore monetary or strange trade policy considering the latter is not supposed to deal with fiscal objectives. Too, these courses generally practice not hash out regulations. 2/ The implicit supposition is that those objectives can merely exist pursued through revenue enhancement and public expenditure instruments. The higher the level of tax or of public spending, the greater the office of the regime In the economy is causeless to be. On this assumption, the regime plays a much larger part in Sweden than in Japan and in industrial countries than in developing countries. Those who wish to impose constitutional limits on the level of taxation ought to be pleased with its level in developing countries.

Developing countries are generally characterized by: (a) an income distribution that is less even than in industrial countries; 3/ (b) less stable macroeconomic developments, as measured by fluctuations in output, prices, or balances of payments outcomes; and (c) more than pervasive market failure due to lack of information, prevalence of monopoly or monopolistic practices, and externalities of various kind. 1/

While the evidence available points to a greater need for governmental action in developing countries every bit compared with industrial countries, it is the latter that showroom a much larger function for the regime when that role is measured by levels of revenue enhancement and public spending: On the average, the level of tax and of public spending, measured as a share of Gross domestic product, is at least twice every bit large in industrial countries as in developing countries. As pointed out in a higher place, this deviation cannot be explained by a lower need for public sector intervention in developing countries. It is, rather, explained by these countries' difficulties In raising tax revenue. For a diverseness of reasons, which cannot exist discussed here, the developing countries are far less successful at collecting taxes than the industrial countries. Does this hateful that the policymakers of the developing countries calibration down their policy objectives to reflect this reality? An argument volition be made in the side by side section that, often, governments that cannot raise a desired level of tax acquirement do not scale downwardly their role in the economy, merely, rather, they attempt to pursue that role through nonfiscal instruments. Thus, the office of the government is not reduced, but the manner in which that role is pursued is changed. These other instruments are largely, but not exclusively, quasi-financial activities and quasi-financial regulations. These are activities not connected with the budget but which can have furnishings, broadly similar to those of financial actions.

Quasi-financial activities and regulations have also been of import in industrial countries when the desire to maintain a larger role for the authorities has collided with the reality of inadequate tax revenue. In some cases, as for example in Italian republic for much of the 1970s and function of the 1980s, this led to the creation of quasi-fiscal activities within the fiscal arrangement which allowed the government to finance more cheaply its public debt. (See Bruni, Penati and Porta, 1989.) In other cases, such as the Usa in the 1980s, this led to the use of quasi-financial regulations ofttimes referred to as unfunded mandates to local governments and to private enterprises. In general, one finds that these quasi-fiscal activities tend to exist more used by the less avant-garde industrial countries.

III. The Importance of Quasi-Fiscal Activities and Regulations

If a authorities wanted to encourage an economical activeness, information technology would normally exist all-time if it did it through a subsidy to that activity given through the budget. If a government wanted to discourage an economical activity, it would be best if it did information technology through a taxation. This is the standard Pigouvian mode of dealing with both positive and negative externalities. In reality, however, and especially in developing countries, the economical encouragement or discouragement of certain activities is ofttimes non done through the upkeep but through other means, mainly quasi-fiscal activities or quasi-fiscal regulations. 1/ These are fiscal actions carried through nonfiscal instruments. They are, thus, outside the budget, replacing the spending-taxing part of the budget.

In a well working market economy, regulations should be limited to helping define the rules of the game and to protecting the citizens against particular risks, Thus, the authorities could regulate the merger of firms, to maintain competition; it could require children vaccination, to ensure health; it could regulate the distribution of pharmaceutical products for the same reason; information technology could decide traffic rules and require driver's licenses to ensure traffic rubber; information technology could regulate banks and insurance companies to protect their customers confronting unwarranted behavior by those who run those institutions, and so on. Within limits, these are considered legitimate regulatory activities on the part of the public sector. They would not be considered quasi-financial regulations. The function of a driver's license or of traffic regulations cannot exist replaced by a tax and a subsidy.

i. Quasi-fiscal regulations

Yet, assume that the government wants to help poor families by subsidizing the rental cost of their lodgings. ii/ It could practise It with an explicit subsidy to the relevant families given through the budget and financed through taxation. Without discussing the merit of this policy, this would be a normal use of the taxing-spending instruments of governments. Presume, nonetheless, that the revenue enhancement or other ordinary resources of the government are limited, merely that the government still wants to pursue its objective of subsidizing the rental expenditures of poor families. A quasi-fiscal regulation that will broadly promote this objective is rent controls. Rent controls are equivalent to a policy that subsidizes the rentees and taxes the rentors. three/ In other words, rent controls replace the part of the budget and thus reduce the level of revenue enhancement and the level of spending while still broadly pursuing the government objectives. The fact that the finish consequence of this governmental action is likely to be less efficient in terms of the objective sought than if information technology were done through the budget is office of our story, but it does not change the reality that rent controls are substitutes for actions that could be taken through the upkeep. There are many other examples of quasi-fiscal regulations from zoning laws to uncompensated and obligatory military service.

ii. Quasi-fiscal activities through the strange exchange system

Assume that a state exports coffee and imports medicines and that the government wants to subsidize the use of medicines past taxing the coffee producers. A conventional, though non economically efficient governmental policy, i/ would be to revenue enhancement the exporters of coffee, thus raising the level of revenue enhancement, and to subsidize the importers of medicines, thus raising the level of public spending. However, the government may have difficulties (administratively or politically) in pursuing this course of action. An administratively or politically easier alternative is to use the exchange rate mechanism to promote the same social objective past using appreciated exchange rates for the import of medicinals and for the export of java. ii/ The government compels the coffee exporters to sell to the central bank their foreign commutation earnings for which they receive a smaller amount (in domestic currency) than they would accept received if they had been costless to sell their foreign exchange in the marketplace. The government then sells this foreign substitution (also at an appreciated rate) to the importers of medicines, who buy their medicines more cheaply (in domestic currency). One time again, taxing (the coffee producers) and subsidizing (the users of medicines) has taken identify without an apparent effect on the level of taxation and on the level of public spending. The unwary observer, who used the conventional data on taxing and spending, would conclude that the role of the government in that land is more express than it really is.

The to a higher place example can exist extended to the export of other agricultural products and, especially, to the export of mineral products. In each instance, the exporters are forced to yield to the authorities, at an overvalued commutation charge per unit, the strange commutation that they earn. 3/ Thus, de facto, these exporters are beingness taxed sometimes at very loftier rates. When the strange exchange is provided to the importers of detail products, also at an overvalued exchange charge per unit, the net result is like to that of a budgetary subsidy to the goods that use this substitution charge per unit for imports. Multiple exchange rate regimes are very mutual (see Imf, 1994). Depending on the coverage of the special rates, the quasi-fiscal taxes and subsidies they entail can be substantial.

Quantitative import restrictions are also oftentimes used by many countries. These also provide implicit subsidies to some groups and implicit taxes to others. However, it is frequently difficult to quantify these effects.

3. Quasi-fiscal activities through the financial organisation

Quasi-financial activities are often carried out through the financial system and can take many forms. But they all result in the implicit taxation of some groups (depositors, holders of greenbacks) and in the implicit subsidy of other groups (borrowers, banks with trouble loans, government). In all cases, they do not result in explicit tax acquirement or public spending. They thus pb to lower ratios of taxes or public spending in GDP. A comprehensive analysis of this aspect is not possible here. 1/ We limit ourselves to a few examples.

In some cases, the financial institutions are required to lend to enterprises or to the regime at below marketplace involvement rates. 2/ Or, some financial Institutions tin can benefit from preferential rediscounting practices with the fundamental depository financial institution and tin thus pass on an implicit subsidy to those who borrow from them. Or, highly risky borrowers can get the loans at an interest rate that does non reflect the risk. Or, some borrowers can borrow at a risk-free rate because the government (or some role of information technology such as the cardinal banking concern) guarantees the loans. In however other cases, the government gets subsidized credit by forcing banks to hold uncompensated or undercompensated loftier reserve requirements at the cardinal bank. In most cases, "… control on international capital flows [are] coupled with controls on domestic financial intermediaries" (Giovannini and De Melo, 1993, p. 953). These controls result in "financial repression" which is a form of implicit tax.

We take provided examples of governmental activities that are common particularly among developing countries and economies in transition and that upshot in implicit revenue enhancement. This taxation is at times accompanied by implicit subsidies to particular groups while in other cases it is for the do good of the government that can thus pursue some of its objectives without raising explicit taxes. Inflationary finance, that is, the direct lending by the central bank to the government, is an case of a quasi-fiscal operation that is mainly an implicit revenue enhancement (on holders of cash) collected by the regime. Upward to a sure betoken, this tax increases with the level of inflation.

In the adjacent section, nosotros provide available quantitative estimates of some of these activities, These are by no means all the channels through which what are substantially fiscal objectives of the government are pursued through the use of nonfiscal instrument. In some fashion, what we have shown is merely the tip of the iceberg.

Four. Some Quantification

In the previous section, we have provided examples of quasi-financial activities and quasi-fiscal regulations that tin can proxy for the spending and taxing actions of the authorities. We have argued that these activities and regulations allow the government to play a larger part without having to heighten taxes or spend more. We accept no manner of quantifying all of these quasi-financial activities and even less the quasi-fiscal regulations. If nosotros could, we would attempt to answer the question: By how much would the tax level and the spending level take to rise to supercede the Implicit taxes and subsidies with conventional or explicit taxes and regime spending? Yet some idea of the dimensions involved can be obtained from the analysis of a few specific quasi-fiscal activities. Here we report some available estimates.

Giovannini and De Melo (1993) take estimated the implicit taxes that the governments of various countries obtain from "controls on international capital flows coupled with controls on domestic financial intermediaries" (ibid., p. 953). These controls allow governments to finance themselves at artificially low interest rates. These authors emphasize that their estimates are minimum estimates because they limit their calculations to the Interest that the government saves on servicing its debt. They are thus likely to substantially underestimate the truthful scope of quasi-fiscal "revenue" from the financial sector.

Table 2 reports these estimates for 24 countries. The table shows that acquirement from fiscal repression tin be very high both as shares of GDP and equally shares of (conventionally measured) tax acquirement. For the years reported, these implicit taxes raised more than than five percentage of GDP in Mexico and in Zimbabwe and smaller simply still big amounts in several other countries, Hellenic republic, Portugal, and Turkey are the only European countries in the table each "raising" a flake over two percentage of Gdp from this source. The unweighted average for the whole grouping is two percent of Gross domestic product and nine pct of government acquirement. 1/

Table ii.

The Size of Revenue from Financial Repression

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Source: Giovannini and De Melo, op. cit., p. 959.

The sample for Zaire does non include the years 1981, 1982, and 1983.

Maxwell Fry (1993) has estimated, for 26 countries, the seigniorage that the government received from its monopoly over coin cosmos in 1984. 2/ This is acquirement additional to that from fiscal repression. When this seigniorage leads to inflation, information technology is a kind of excise taxation whose revenue is obtained past multiplying the taxation rate (which is the electric current inflation rate) past the revenue enhancement base of operations which is the "… geometric average of kickoff-of-year and cease-of-twelvemonth values of currency in circulation plus bank reserves." (p.10). Fry'south estimates are shown in Tabular array three. One time once again, the revenue importance of these implicit taxes is hit. In five countries (Argentine republic, Egypt, Mexico, Republic of peru and Yugoslavia) this unorthodox revenue source generated more than than seven percent of GDP and large proportions of tax revenue. Once once more, these estimates pertain to 1984. Major changes have taken place since then in some of these countries. Christopher Chamley (1991) has too attempted to estimate the tax revenue from implicit financial tax in 4 African countries--Ghana, Somalia, Zaire and Zambia--for the 1971-1986 period. He has used ii culling methods for this calculation. 1/ The boilerplate revenues for the whole period, shown equally percentages of Gdp, are given in Table 4. Once more, the importance of this implicit source of revenue is obvious. The yearly estimations, shown in Chamley's article, betoken a groovy variability of this source. In particular years, it provided much higher values than those shown in Table iv.

Table 3.

Seigniorage Revenue in 26 Developing Countries, 1984

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Source: Imf, International Financial Statistics and World Bank, World Tables 1989-90: Socio-economical Time-serial Access and Retrieval Organization, Version 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: World Banking concern, March 1990). Taken from Fry, op. cit., p. xi.

1985.

1986.

1987.

Seigniorage, 1985.

Table 4.

Revenue enhancement Revenue from Implicit Fiscal Taxation In Selected Countries, 1971-1986 Averages

(Percentages of Gross domestic product)

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Source: Arranged from Table 2 in Chamley (1991), pp. 524-525.

Unfortunately, at that place are no proficient estimates of the implicit taxes and subsidies associated with multiple exchange rate systems, domestic toll controls, or quantitative restrictions on trade. The bits of evidence betoken that these taxes or subsidies may be very high. For example, Brian Pinto (1989, p. 329) has estimated that the implicit marginal taxation rate on exports by Ghana was 91 pct. This implicit tax was a event of the overvaluation of the commutation rate.

V. Terminal Remarks

This paper has addressed some issues related to the positive office of the government. It has highlighted the fact that governments can pursue their roles in various ways and through diverse instruments. These instruments extend well beyond the range of taxes and public spending which are the ones that attract most attention particularly by public finance economists. The use of quasi-fiscal activities and quasi-financial regulations is common among countries. These are nonfiscal instruments used to achieve or to influence the aforementioned objectives as those pursued through taxes and regime spending.

While all countries use, to some extent, these other instruments, much greater prevalence of their use is institute in developing countries and, to a lesser extent, in poorer industrial countries. Economies in transition also brand much utilize of them. The information available suggests that quantitatively--in terms of the percent of GDP that would be needed to replace them with explicit taxes and public spending--these other instruments, in developing countries, may be as important as the traditional taxation and spending instruments. 2/ Considering the developing countries have levels of taxation which, every bit percentages of Gross domestic product, are only almost one-half equally large as the industrial countries', it can exist ended that through the use of these quasi-fiscal instruments, the governments of developing countries attempt to play roles which may not be too different from those of the governments of industrial countries. They just practice it with different tools. Thus, those who favor a minimalist role for the state should not become excited when the tax level of a state is low until they assure themselves that traditional tax sources take not been replaced past less-traditional, or hidden, implicit taxes.

We could formulate a general hypothesis, which, admittedly, has not been fully proven in this newspaper. With inevitable variance around the mean--due in part to the random presence of more than or less conservative governments at given times and in given countries--most governments would like to play broadly similar roles. When the taxes they tin raise are not sufficient to finance the desired expenditures, they tend to rely on less orthodox, nontax instruments. Peradventure a corollary of this full general hypothesis is that governmental goals alter more than over time than beyond space. 1/ Demonstration furnishings might explain the tendency for the governments of various countries (adjusting again for the political coloring of the party in ability) to try to promote like goals and to play similar roles. When these roles change over time, they tend to change for all countries.

Public finance specialists and, perhaps, most other economists believe that financial instruments are more efficient than quasi-financial instruments in pursuing the office of the land. Economists normally prefer taxes over regulations, and direct, budgetary subsidies over subsidies given through quotas, subsidized credit so on. In this context, the term "efficiency" has two distinct meanings: every bit divers by Tinbergen, and as generally used by economists (i.e., having to do with Pareto optimum and the resource allotment of resources). On both grounds, economists as a group tend to adopt financial to other instruments. However, in particular cases--such as for inflationary finance--some major economists, such every bit Phelps (1972) and Dixit (1991) take argued that the economic efficiency of particular instruments tin simply be judged in the context of a full general equilibrium arroyo. Thus, a priori ane cannot exist sure that taxation is always preferable to inflationary finance. Furthermore, the alternative of raising more than tax acquirement may non be available and the marginal benefit of public spending may be very high. This latter point was made for multiple substitution rates by E. M. Bernstein every bit far back equally 1950 when he wrote:

"The case of multiple [exchange] rates as a taxation service… does not rest on its economic merit. It rests rather on the fact that information technology is easy to impose … [and] that it is easy to enforce … These are not adept reasons for preferring 1 type of revenue enhancement to another. They may, however, have the merit, in countries with budgetary difficulties, of being better than no additional taxes." (Bernstein, 1950, pp. 236-237).

However, today, most economists believe that these alternative acquirement sources are very inefficient. Furthermore, the particular case for inflationary finance (the case discussed by Phelps and Dixit) is considerably weakened when 1 takes into account the loss in tax revenue that often accompanies high inflation in the presence of significant collection lags. (Encounter on this Tanzi, 1978.)

The in a higher place discussion leads to some rather uncomfortable conclusions. Current attitudes and thinking show a potent preference for (a) purely fiscal over quasi-fiscal tools for promoting the government's goals; (b) economically efficient over distortionary taxes; (c) the complete separation of financial from budgetary policy and the elimination of budgetary repression. The preference for this separation is axiomatic from the many papers now available arguing for the complete independence of cardinal banks which would eliminate the quasi-fiscal role played by these institutions; 1/ and (d) the removal of all impediments to merchandise and specially those associated with multiple commutation rates and quantitative restrictions. 2/

These preferences will, In time, significantly reduce the instruments and the controls available to the governments to pursue their goals. This is clearly desirable and consequent with a greater dependence on the marketplace. If the governments can scale downward their goals to brand them consistent with their reduced ability to control, and with the greater role given to the market, the reduction in the apply of quasi-financial instruments and in the total resources that the governments take controlled through explicit and implicit taxes will lead to a healthier economy. Nonetheless, if governments cannot moderate their objectives, and/or do not find market-friendly ways of promoting them, one/ and so fiscal deficits might get more common than they have been because governments may not reduce, or may even increase spending in the confront of reduced resource. This problem volition be of item relevance to developing countries and to economies in transition: 2/ first, considering these countries are the ones that have relied the virtually on quasi-fiscal instruments; and second, considering these countries will have greater difficulties in raising needed revenue from efficient tax sources. In these countries, the need to moderate the ambitions of governments and to build strong revenue sources from efficient tax systems will be specially great. Major reforms in taxes and in public spending will be an essential feature of future developments. 3/

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